Bastiaan D. van der Velden - Publications & Research
Many Roman-Dutch law scholars have historically denied the existence of slavery in the Dutch Republic. Some magistrates even rejected the idea that enslaved individuals could be claimed by their owners on Dutch soil. In 1785, law student Benjamin P. van Wesele Scholten observed:
“The doctrine of those who believe slaves brought from India to the Dutch Republic or other parts of Europe become free by breathing the free air cannot be substantiated.”
Although concepts like “free soil” or “free air” existed, they had little force in private law relations. No codified or customary rule automatically granted freedom to enslaved individuals upon arrival in the Republic.
In reality, enslaved individuals lived in Dutch cities, where magistrates supported owners in reclaiming “their property,” and even after manumission, former slaves’ obligations towards their former owners were part of the positive law. Excessive reliance on authority created a distorted perception: the law in books often diverged sharply from the law in practice. As Jean Gaudemet reminds us, “the truth in law comes from testimonies, not from the authority of academic jurists.” The States-General abandoned the “free soil principle” in 1596, prioritizing the property rights of a slave owner.
Legal avenues for enslaved people to claim freedom were severely limited. According to the 1736 Hoge Raad procedure in Holland, an enslaved individual had to appear in court with a curator ad litem—a legal guardian—to sue the owner for freedom. There are no known cases where enslaved people successfully gained freedom through this process. Even if freedom was attained in the Republic, it often became meaningless if someone returned to VOC or WIC colonies, where their status remained enslaved.
The likelihood of obtaining freedom depended heavily on the status, religion, and nationality of both the enslaved person and the owner, as well as whether individuals arrived alone or in groups. The legal consequences of arrival in the Republic varied: fugitives from WIC or VOC territories remained enslaved.
The Bellagio–Harvard Guidelines emphasize that states cannot unilaterally declare slavery nonexistent. Their strength lies in examining the legal structures that sustained slavery, as researched in my book. In the Dutch Republic, individuals labeled with an enslaved status under colonial law remained so. Property rights of the owner consistently outweighed the personal freedom of the people with an enslaved status.
This tension echoes a broader Dutch historical narrative: William of Orange fought against political oppression; a king (the Spanish) who treats his subjects as slaves should be regarded not as a prince but as a tyrant, a sentiment echoed in the national anthem, Wilhelmus. The aversion to (political) slavery remains a constant in the Dutch self-image, even when it remained difficult to reconcile with the existence of enslaved people in the Dutch colonies and in Holland.
Below: E. van Zurck, Codex Batavus, Rotterdam: J.D. Beman 1738, 3e druk bewerkt door P. van der Schelling, 1031.
